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Abstract 
We investigate cross-hour effects in spousal labor supply exploiting independent variation in 
hours worked generated by the introduction of the short workweek in  France in  the late 
1990s. We find that female and male employees treated by the shorter legal workweek reduce 
their weekly labor supply by about 2 hours, and do not experience any reduction in their 
monthly earnings. While wives of treated men do not seem to adjust their working time at 
either the intensive or extensive margins, husbands of treated wives respond by cutting their 
labor supply by about half an hour to one hour per week, according to specifications and 
samples.  Further  tests  reveal  that  husbands’  labor  supply  response  did  not  entail  the 
renegotiation of usual hours with employers or changes in earnings, but involved instead a 
reduction in (unpaid) work involvement, whether within a given day, or through an increase 
in the take-up rate of paid vacation and/or sick leave. These margins of adjustment are shown 
to have no detrimental impact on men’s (current) earnings. The estimated cross-hour effects 
are consistent with the presence of spousal leisure complementarity for husbands, though not 
for wives. 
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I.  Introduction 
Interdependencies in spousal labor supply have long been identified as an important factor 
shaping individual labor market outcomes (see e.g. Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974). 
Complementarities in labor supply and leisure within or beyond the household are also a key 
policy issue, as they represent a channel through which reforms targeted at specific segments 
of the population can ultimately affect a wider sample of individuals. When the value of 
leisure time for an individual depends on the amount of leisure enjoyed by her family 
members, co-workers, neighbors, social contacts, etc., reforms of the welfare state, or tax 
reforms, or changes in workweek regulations aimed at some segments of the workforce may 
impact individual behavior well beyond the targeted population (Alesina, Glaeser and 
Sacerdote, 2005). 
While spillovers in work and leisure represent an important and controversial issue, 
there is still little micro-level evidence on the actual magnitude of these effects. Progress in 
this direction has been limited by the difficulty of finding independent variation in the labor 
supply of one’s peers, as individuals within the same social or family network may be subject 
to the same reforms, or more in general to correlated labor supply shocks. Another major 
challenge is that changes in leisure time and working hours for individuals are in most cases 
associated with important changes in their earnings. Thus the labor supply responses of peers 
cannot be interpreted as reflecting pure cross-hour effects, as they may also encompass cross-
earning effects.  
In this paper we exploit the specific design of the workweek reduction policy 
implemented in France in the late 1990s to overcome these issues and provide one of the very 
first micro estimates of the effect of an exogenous change in individuals’ number of hours 
worked on the labor supply behavior of their spouses.    3
In June 1998 the French socialist government mandated a reduction of the legal 
workweek, from 39 to 35 hours, to be implemented in large firms by January 2000 and in 
small firms by January 2002, without an associated reduction in monthly earnings.  In order to 
attenuate the impact of higher hourly wages on profitability, employers who would implement 
the shorter workweek before the relevant deadline would benefit from significant cuts in their 
payroll taxes. In January 2000 the Government pushed back the deadline for full adoption of 
the shorter workweek, and only about 300,000 firms had implemented it before the come back 
of the conservative party to power in April 2002 and the interruption of the original workweek 
reform. The reform implied a noticeable change in the workweek of at least one spouse in 
over one third of French households, with no direct impact on family income. Both within-
household variation in the workweek reduction, and the absence of income effects, make the 
French worksharing reform a unique scenario for assessing cross-hour effects between 
spouses. 
In general, it is theoretically ambiguous whether a fall in working hours and thus an 
increase in ‘non-market’ time of one spouse would generate a fall or a rise in working hours 
of the other spouse. Substitutability in non-market time of husbands and wives could be 
driven by substitutable spouse efforts in home production. A reduction in the workweek of 
one spouse would shift some of her time endowment from market to home production, thus 
freeing up some home production time of the other spouse, who could devote more time to 
market work. Conversely, if one detects complementarity in non-market time of spouses, this 
would rather be consistent with complementarity of their leisure time. A reduction in the 
workweek of one spouse would increase her leisure time and thus raise the value of leisure of 
the other spouse if spouses enjoy spending time together. Alternative explanations for 
complementarity of non-market time could rest on other forms of social interactions, such as 
for example spouses influencing each other’s perceptions and adjusting accordingly their 
preferences about work, leisure and work-life balance.   4
This paper uses a unique matched worker-firm dataset obtained by combining the 
French Labor Force Survey with firm level information on the implementation of the shorter 
workweek, in order to estimate the labor supply response of men and women to a reduction in 
the legal workweek in their spouses’ workplaces. We detect an average reduction of about 2 
hours in the workweek of both male and female employees whose employers signed a 
workweek reduction agreement.
2 When looking at spousal responses, we find that women do 
not adjust their labor supply, whether at the intensive or extensive margin, when their 
husbands become subject to the shorter workweek. Men, by contrast, tend to work about 0.5 
hours less per week when their wives become treated, independent of whether or not a man’s 
own employer signed a workweek reduction agreement at the same time as his wife’s 
employer.  
Further tests reveal that men’s labor supply response to wife treatment is not 
associated with a reduction in their usual working hours, but with a reduction in the ‘non-
usual’ component of their workweek. Moreover, such response does not involve a loss of 
earnings, suggesting that husbands cut on some form of unpaid work involvement, whether 
within a given day, or through an increase in the take-up rate of paid vacation and/or sick 
leave. If employees do not use their whole paid leave entitlement, or simply spend some 
unproductive time at work, they have some leeway in cutting their hours while avoiding 
earnings losses, and it is mostly by adjusting around these unpaid work margins that men 
respond to shorter workweek agreements in their wives’ firms.  
These estimates are all the more suggestive as the direct (first-stage) effect of shorter 
workweek agreements on treated wives is estimated to be only about 2 hours. Assuming that 
the workweek reduction in wives’ firms affects their husbands only via wives’ labor supply, 
we provide an instrumental variable estimate of the average cross-hour effect for husbands of 
                                                 
2 As discussed below, there are various reasons why the average effect of the shorter legal workweek on actual 
weekly hours is lower than the legal workweek reduction, including the fact that the shorter legal workweek may 
not have been binding for employees initially working below 35 hours.     5
0.24, rising to 0.38 for managers and professionals, and to 0.58 for fathers of young children. 
The interpretation is that managers and professionals work relatively longer hours and have 
much closer control on their actual hours than employees in less-skilled occupations. For 
fathers, the leisure complementarity motive is plausibly stronger than for the childless, in so 
far children may be interpreted as household public good (Lundberg, 1988).  
Our estimated spillover effects would imply a value for the social multiplier in the 
range 1.1 to 1.3, depending on household composition. That is, the equilibrium labor supply 
response to an exogenous shock is about 10% to 30% larger than the initial impact. As 
discussed by Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003), the role of social interactions and 
social multipliers may vary widely across demographic groups and levels of aggregation, and 
the French reform provides a clean experiment to identify the multiplier in labor supply at the 
household level. 
By looking at interdependencies in labor supply within the household, our paper 
relates to a long strand of literature on family labor supply, dating back (at least) to seminal 
work by Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974). This literature typically investigates the response 
of an individual’s labor supply to independent changes in her spouse’s income and/or hours of 
work. These changes may in turn be driven by events as diverse as retirement, job loss, fiscal 
reforms, etc. There is a fairly large literature documenting a positive correlation between 
husbands’ and wives’ retirement decisions, over and above what would be predicted by 
correlation in age and incentives in the retirement system (see, among others, Blau, 1998, and 
Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000). Conversely, the added worker effect literature detects a mild 
substitutability between spousal labor supply, as married women tend to increase their 
working hours following husband’s job loss (Lundberg, 1985). More recently, Gelber (2011) 
exploits the Swedish tax reform of 1990-91 to examine the response of husbands’ and wives’ 
earnings to a change in the marginal tax rate for the other spouse, and shows that as net-of-tax 
earnings of one's spouse rise, own earnings rise too. Insofar earnings responses reflect labor   6
supply responses, these findings suggest complementarity in spousal leisure. 
Complementarity is also detected by Hamermesh (2002), who finds that spouses’ daily work 
schedules are more synchronized than would occur randomly. While building on very 
different sources of variation, these papers tend to agree in documenting important spillovers 
in the labor supply behavior of spouses.  
Our contribution to this literature is threefold. First, we exploit independent variation 
in spousal hours of work, while keeping monthly earnings constant. This allows us to abstract 
from income effects of changes in spousal labor supply, and focus on pure cross-hour effects. 
In particular, under the assumption that an employee’s workweek regulations affect their 
spouses only via their labor supply, we can recover an estimate of the structural parameter 
capturing leisure complementarity in the utility function. Secondly, while most of the existing 
literature has focused on the labor supply response of secondary earners, we show in this 
paper that it is in fact men who significantly cut their working hours following the adoption of 
the shorter workweek in their wives’ workplaces, while the corresponding women’s response 
is close to zero. This may in turn be due to different degrees of leisure complementarities in 
spouses’ utility functions, or a greater ability of men to control their working schedules. 
Thirdly, we provide evidence on specific adjustment margins in labor supply spillovers, and 
in particular we find that it is mostly husbands’ unpaid involvement in their workplace that is 
affected when their wives’ workweek is reduced.  
Our paper is also related to the literature on work-sharing policies in developed 
countries. The study which is closest to ours is Hunt (1998), who shows that the gradual 
decline in standard working hours of male, German employees between 1984 and 1994 was 
not accompanied by changes in their wives’ employment rates, but nevertheless produced a 
small decline in their hours of work. These results, while consistent with complementarity in 
spousal leisure, may also reflect underlying trends in female labor supply in Germany over 
this period, including wives’ own gradual exposure to shorter standard workweeks.   7
Finally, our paper adds to the literature evaluating the effects of workweek reduction 
reforms in France (see e.g. Crépon and Kramarz, 2002, Crépon, Leclair and Roux, 2004, 
Askenazy, 2008, Estevao and Sa, 2008, Chemin and Wasmer, 2009). Existing evaluations 
typically focus on the employment effects of such reforms by comparing employment levels 
across large and small firms (or across regions) before and after the introduction of the shorter 
workweek. The focus and methodology of our paper are different insofar we exploit variation 
in the exact dates of implementation of the workweek reduction across firms to investigate the 
labor supply response of individuals to their spouses’ reduction in working hours. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section II gives an overview of the workweek 
reduction reform. Section III describes the data used and provides some graphic analysis of 
the effect of the workweek reduction on treated individuals and their spouses. Section IV 
presents our main regression results. Section V shows robustness of our results to alternative 
identification strategies. Section VI provides instrumental variable estimates of cross-hour 
effects, using mandated workweek reductions as instruments for spousal labor supply. Section 
VII finally concludes. 
II.   Historical and institutional context  
Since the early 1980s, the legal workweek in France has been 39 hours. The overtime wage 
premium was 25%, and the maximum number of overtime hours per worker was set at 130 
per year. In 1993, the French economy went through one of the most severe recessions of the 
post-war period, accompanied by a rapid increase in unemployment, reaching the peak rate of 
12% in 1996. In this highly depressed context, the French conservative government passed a 
law offering private firms fiscal incentives to expand employment levels through a workweek 
reduction (Robien law). The impact of the Robien law was very limited, with less than 3,000 
workweek reduction agreements signed with unions, affecting less than 2% of the workforce   8
(see Fiole and Roger, 2002). The law did not modify the legal workweek, which remained at 
39 hours. 
In April 1997, the French president Jacques Chirac dissolved the parliament and called 
general elections one year ahead of the end of the legislature. This decision was highly 
unexpected and the electoral campaign that followed was very short. The socialist party 
proposed a program whose main axis was the reduction of unemployment through 
worksharing, with two basic slogans: “travailler moins pour travailler tous” (work less in 
order to work all) and “35 heures payées 39” (35 worked hours paid 39). The left coalition 
won the election in June 1997.  
The workweek reduction was implemented in two steps (see Askenazy, 2008, for a 
detailed description of the reform). The first law (Aubry I, named after the then labor secretary 
Martine Aubry) was passed in June 1998. It set the legal workweek at 35 hours in the private 
sector and mandated that the new workweek be implemented by January 2000 in firms with 
more than 20 employees, and by January 2002 in smaller firms.
3 Hours worked beyond the 
35
th hour would be treated as overtime hours, subject to a 25% hourly wage premium and to a 
maximum of 130 overtime hours per employee per year.  
Also, the law stipulated that firms who would implement the shorter workweek 
through a collective agreement with unions before the relevant deadline would benefit from 
substantial cuts in payroll taxes,
4 provided that they commited to maintain employment levels.  
Finally, the law required that workers should not experience a drop in their monthly 
earnings following the legal workweek reduction. In particular, firms who passed a 35-hours 
agreement had to grant a specific (4 hours) bonus to workers paid the monthly minimum 
wage. The general purpose of the law was to induce firms to raise employment levels by 
                                                 
3 There were no explicit deadlines set for firms in the public sector. 
4 For workers paid at the minimum wage, the tax cut corresponds to a reduction of about 8% in total labor cost 
for 5 years.   9
worksharing, while offering them fiscal advantages to attenuate detrimental impacts of this 
reform on profitability. 
In January 2000, the second law (Aubry II) introduced several additional regulations in 
order to limit the cost of the shorter workweek to employers. In particular, it became possible 
to implement the shorter workweek via slightly modified definitions of working time, without 
losing eligibility for fiscal aids. For example, it became possible for employers to exclude 
‘unproductive breaks’ from the definition of working time. Also, firms could introduce 
shorter working hours on an annual – rather than weekly – basis, with a cap on annual hours 
being set at 1600. In practice it means that a collective agreement could be signed (and fiscal 
advantages obtained) even with actual reductions of working hours below 10%. Most 
importantly, the new law introduced a two-year transitional phase during which it became 
possible for employers to keep the 39-hour workweek by using overtime at a reduced 10% 
rate.
 5 
Two years later, in summer 2002, the conservative party came back to power and, 
while the Aubry laws remained formally in place, the whole transition to the shorter 
workweek was discontinued in practice. The new conservative government raised the 
maximum number of overtime hours from 130 to 220, and extended fiscal incentives to all 
firms, including those that did not sign workweek reduction agreements. In this new scenario 
firms could effectively have employees working 39 hours weekly, at no extra hourly cost with 
respect to the pre-reform period. As a consequence of these political changes, the 35-hour was 
never fully implemented, especially in small private firms. Nevertheless, the Aubry laws have 
had a very large impact on the French economy, with roughly 350,000 agreements signed, 
covering about 10 million workers.  
                                                 
5 Furthermore, employers were no longer required to commit to maintain employment levels in order to be 
eligible for payroll tax cuts.     10
To sum up, the French workweek reform had several important features: it was 
unexpected; it has been interrupted, with only a fraction of workers being affected; it did not 
affect monthly earnings; and given its gradual implementation it would likely not treat 
spouses in a given household at the same time. In the remainder of this paper, we will build 
on these features of the reform in order to evaluate the effect of an exogenous variation in an 
individual’s workweek on the number of hours worked by her spouse. 
III.   Data and descriptive evidence 
III.1 Data 
We combine individual level information on worker characteristics and working hours with 
firm level information on collective agreements signed by employers who adopted the shorter 
workweek. 
We use individual records from the French Labor Force Surveys (hereafter, LFS), 
which is conducted each year by the French Statistical Office (Institut National de la 
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, herafter, INSEE). Before 2003, the LFS was 
conducted in March of every year, and covered a representative sample of about 100,000 
households each year (with a 1/300 sampling rate). From 2003 onward, the survey is 
conducted each quarter and covers a representative sample of about 55,000 households each 
quarter. Our main analysis will be based on all repeated cross-sections from 1994-2002, 
namely all annual 1994-2002 surveys, and all first quarterly surveys for 2003-2009.  
For each household member aged 15 or above, the LFS provides information on 
gender, marital status, employment status, occupation, educational level, industry, monthly 
earnings and hours worked during the previous week. 
Crucial for our purposes, our restricted use version of the LFS also provides employer 
identifiers. Specifically, each employee is asked to report the name and address of her   11
employer, and this information is coded by INSEE. The coded employer identifier is available 
for just over 80% of the employees in the LFS.
6 This information allows us to match worker 
level information with firm level information from the DARES-URSSAF dataset, an 
administrative database collected by the French Ministry of Labor, which provides detailed 
information on all firms who signed a workweek reduction agreement, including the signing 
and implementation dates. We thus obtain a matched employer-employee dataset containing 
information on working hours of respondents and their spouses, as well as information on 
when, if ever, their employers implemented the shorter workweek.  
The matched employer-employee dataset used has some clear advantages compared to 
the non-matched LFS. First, it allows us to identify which workers were actually treated, and 
not simply the intention to treat based on the number of employees in their firms and the 
proximity to the law deadlines.
7 Also, the information on the exact date of treatment makes it 
possible to exploit the gradual implementation of the shorter workweek, thus avoiding to 
solely rely on the announced 2000 and 2002 deadlines. 
III.2 Descriptive  statistics  
In what follows we focus on a sample of married or cohabiting respondents, whose spouse is a 
wage-earner, and we focus on the labor supply response of main respondents to spousal 
exposure to the shorter workweek. We restrict our analysis to respondents aged 18-65, and 
drop the small number of those whose spouses’ employers signed an agreement either before 
1996 or after 2002, since it is not clear whether these early and late agreements really 
correspond to the reforms implemented in the late 1990s. Our working sample includes 
189,894 males and 236,802 females. 
                                                 
6 Most cases with missing employer ID correspond to very small firms. For a detailed description of the coding 
procedure, see Abowd and Kramarz (1999) or Goux and Maurin (1999).  
7 For example, a recent contribution by Ahmed (2009) compares wives’ labor market transitions before and after 
1998 using the small fraction of wives whose husbands are part-timers in small firms as a control group.   12
Table 1 provides some basic descriptive statistics on our sample, distinguishing 
between male and female respondents, and by the treatment status of their spouses. 
Throughout the paper we define as treated all spouses whose employers ever implement a 
workweek reduction agreement. Both men and women are less likely to work in the public 
sector when they have a treated spouse, which is consistent with the reform having mostly 
affected the private sector. But the age and years of education of both men and women are 
nonetheless very similar whether or not their spouses are treated.  
Table 2 reports the distribution of own and spousal legal workweek status in the 
employed sample, and shows that about 54% of husbands of treated women are non-treated 
themselves by the workweek reduction (Panel A, column 1), while about 29% of husbands of 
non-treated women are treated. Thus there is some assortative mating along the treatment 
dimension, but spouses have nonetheless different treatment status in a large proportion of 
cases. Furthermore, even when both spouses are treated, the timing of treatment differs for 
about half of the couples. Panel B shows a very similar picture for wives of treated and non-
treated men. To further illustrate timing of treatment, Figure 1 graphically shows the gradual 
implementation of the shorter workweek for spouses of employed respondents, i.e. on the 
same sample described in Table 2. While only about 40% of employees are eventually treated 
in this sample, there is substantial variation in treatment dates between 1998 and 2002. 
Information on exact dates of treatment thus allows us to separately identify the direct and 
cross-effects of shorter workweeks across spouses, as in the majority of cases the year of 
treatment differs across spouses. 
III. 3  Graphical evidence: Direct and cross-effects of treatment 
Before moving on to regression analysis, below we provide some simple graphical evidence 
on the direct and cross-effects of the workweek reform on the number of hours worked by 
spouses in our sample. Figure 2 plots hours worked during the survey week by wives who are   13
wage earners, by treatment status (189,894 observations in total). The solid line refers to 
treated wives, and time zero refers to the year in which a shorter workweek agreement is 
implemented at their workplace. Their weekly hours are stable, if anything slightly rising 
during the pre-treatment years, and drops by about 2 upon treatment. The dotted line refers to 
non-treated wives, and reports their working hours for the same dates at which treated wives 
were observed. Their weekly hours follow a gradually rising trend throughout the sample 
period, with no break at time 0. Thus we observe a decline of about 2 hours in working hours 
of treated wives relative to control wives at time of treatment. Interestingly, wives that 
become treated have longer weekly hours initially, and their hours converge almost exactly to 
hours of non-treated wives when their employers adopt the shorter workweek.  
This observed drop in weekly hours for treated wives relative to the non-treated is a 
sort of first-stage effect for the cross-hour effect that we intend to analyse next. A first-stage 
effect of about 2 hours is roughly half the reduction in the legal workweek (i.e. the intended 
first-stage), and this may be explained by a number of factors. In particular, part of the 
implementation of the worktime regulation may have taken place with slight modifications of 
working time definition (for example excluding unproductive breaks from the hours count) or 
reducing the number of weeks worked per year rather than the number of hours worked per 
week, keeping usual weekly hours constant (see also Askenazy, 2008). This would deliver a 
mitigated effect of the workweek reduction on mean actual hours worked in the LFS, as the 
survey week falls in March of each year, and thus tends not to coincide with popular holiday 
seasons. Finally, the effect of the introduction of the 35-hour workweek has also been 
mitigated by the fact that about 30% of French female employees work part-time, and for 
them the shorter workweek would not be binding. The estimated 2-hour drop in working   14
hours can be interpreted as an average of a higher drop for women initially working more than 
35 hours, and a smaller drop for women initially working less than 35 hours.
8  
Given the behavior of treated wives, the next question is whether we observe a 
variation in either the employment rate or the number of hours worked by their husbands. 
Figure 3 shows flat and virtually identical employment patterns of husbands of treated and 
non-treated wives. When focusing on a [-3, +3] years window around time of treatment, the 
difference in employment rates between husbands of treated and non-treated wives is very 
small (about 1.5 percentage points) and almost exactly the same before and after the time of 
the treatment. Thus we detect no spillover effects at the extensive margin.  
Figure 4 then addresses corresponding variations at the intensive margin, by showing 
the impact on hours worked by the subsample of employed husbands, and reveals a sizeable 
drop in average working hours of husbands of treated wives, relative to husbands of non-
treated wives. Specifically, the difference in working hours between the treatment and control 
group is close to zero during the five pre-treatment years, and rises to nearly 1 during the five 
post-treatment years.  
These spillover effects may in part reflect the fact that some husbands were themselves 
employed in firms who adopted the shorter workweek, and thus became treated at the same 
date as their wives. To purge this effect out, we replicate the same trends on a sub-sample that 
excludes households in which spouses became treated at the same date, and still observe a 
clear change in the relative number of hours worked by husbands of treated wives at the time 
of treatment (see Figure A1 in appendix). The same result holds when we further restrict the 
sample to households in which the husband was never treated (see Figure A2). In the 
regression analysis that follows we will pool all households and control for own and spouse 
treatment separately.   
                                                 
8 This specific explanation, however, would not work for men, as the proportion of part-timers among male 
employees is negligible.   15
Figures 5 to 7 repeat a similar analysis for female respondents and their husbands. 
Again we observe a clear drop in working hours of treated relative to non-treated husbands 
(see Figure 5), whose magnitude is very close to that we observed for wives in Figure 2. 
However, we find no evidence of spillover effects on their wives’ labor supply, either at the 
extensive margin (Figure 6), or the intensive margin (Figure 7).  
To summarize, our descriptive evidence is suggestive of labor supply spillovers at the 
intensive margin for husbands of treated wives, but no spillovers at the extensive margins or 
for wives of treated husbands. The next section will show estimates of these effects that 
control for observable characteristics of the individuals, and explore further the nature of 
these spillovers. 
IV.   Regression results 
IV.1   Main estimates 
As in the previous descriptive analysis, we focus on two main outcome variables for each 
individual i in our sample, namely her employment status and her weekly hours worked, and 
assess how each is affected by the implementation of a shorter workweek agreement by her 
spouse’s employer. This would work via an effect on the spouse’s labor supply, and thus we 
start by estimating a first-stage specification that regresses spouse working hours on treatment 
variables and other covariates. We denote by    
  the actual weekly hours worked by the 
spouse, and introduce a dummy variable    
   indicating whether at time   she works for a firm 
who has ever adopted the shorter workweek. Our first-stage regression is the following 
difference-in-differences specification: 
   
         
             
         
                    ( 1 )    16
where        
 	indicates the period following a workweek reduction in the spouse’s firm, 
  	denotes a set of year fixed effects, and    
 	are relevant individual covariates, including a 
constant term. The    coefficient shows the direct (first-stage) effect of workweek regulations 
on labor supply.  
Table 3 shows the regression results for specification (1) for wives (Panel A) and 
husbands (Panel B) of main respondents. All reported standard errors in this and later tables 
are clustered at the year*treatment level (32 clusters). Column (1) in Panel A shows that 
wives working in firms who implemented a workweek reduction agreement were working 
about 1.36 hours more than wives in other firms in the pre-reform period, but then cut their 
labor supply by about 1.81 hours per week once the shorter workweek was implemented. This 
pattern of working hours was also evident from Figure 2, and the only difference here is that 
we control for aggregate time effects and a public sector dummy. Turning to husbands, 
column (1) in Panel B shows small pre-treatment differences (-0.28 hours), but again strong 
and significant effects of the workweek reduction (-1.95 hours). All these estimates are robust 
to the introduction of controls for age, education and industry effects in column (2), 
suggesting that the implementation of the shorter workweek was largely orthogonal to these 
job and worker characteristics.
9  
Columns (3) and (4) in each panel report estimates of a similar specification for (the 
log of) monthly earnings, and once extra controls are included these show near zero effects of 
the workweek reduction on the earnings of wives and husbands. These first-stage results are 
clearly in line with the reform’s intended outcome to shorten the workweek without cutting 
monthly earnings of treated employees. If anything, the effect of the shorter workweek on the 
                                                 
9 Among related work, Gelber and Mitchell (2011) study the impact of changes in US taxes and transfers on 
single men’s and single women’s own labor supply and housework, while Lee, Kawaguchi and Hamermesh 
(2011) look at the impact of changes in Japanese and Korean legal standard hours on individuals’ own 
housework and leisure time.   17
monthly earnings of husbands is positive rather than negative, albeit tiny, and only significant 
at the 10% level. 
We next assess labor supply spillovers by looking at the reduced-form effects of the 
workweek reduction in the spouse firm on the employment status of the main respondent and 
her weekly hours. Note that we can interpret such cross-effects as stemming from the sole 
reduction in the amount of time spent at work by the spouse once we have ruled out the 
presence of income effects, as shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. Our reduced-form 
specification for employment is 
           
             
                    ,       ( 2 )  
where     is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the employed and 0 for the nonemployed. 
For hours worked, we restrict the sample to employed individuals and estimate  
           
             
                                        ,     (3) 
where    	denotes weekly hours conditional on working,    	is a dummy variable denoting 
whether the current employer of the main respondent has ever implemented a shorter 
workweek agreement, whereas         indicates the period following this agreement. The 
main coefficients of interest are   	in model (2) and    in model (3). Note that these 
specifications allow us to estimate cross-effects in labor supply (captured by        
 ), over 
and above the direct effect stemming from the adoption of the shorter workweek in the own 
firm (captured by        ). These two effects can be separately identified in so far treatment 
is not simultaneous for all spouses.  
The regression results are reported in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) refer to 
employment, and columns (3)-(5) refer to weekly hours. Estimates show no evidence of any 
significant cross-effects on employment for men, and the associated point estimate is always 
very close to zero, in line with the trends reported in Figures 3. For women, the cross-effect   18
on employment becomes marginally significant when further controls are included in column 
(2), but its magnitude stays very close to zero. As we find virtually no impact on employment, 
we next look at hours worked for those who are employed.
10 In column (3) of Panel A we 
regress men’s hours on own treatment variables (    and        ), and on their wives’ 
treatment variables (   
   and        
 ). The own treatment effect is about -2,
11 and the cross-
effect is -0.44 and highly significant, showing that when their wife becomes treated by the 
shorter workweek, working men reduce their weekly labor supply by nearly half an hour. The 
magnitude of this effect does not change when we control for individual characteristics of 
respondents (column (4)), or when we exclude own treatment variables     and         
(results not reported). Finally, the estimated cross-effect stays largely unchanged when we 
exclude men who are themselves treated at some point during the sample period (column (5)). 
Panel B reports corresponding estimates for women. While the own effect of 
workweek regulations is negative and significant, the cross effect is positive, small, and not 
significantly different from zero. We thus detect no evidence of any spousal spillover in the 
labor supply of women.
 12 
Our estimates provide one of the first pieces of evidence showing that changes in the 
workweek of a subsample of employees may have a very significant impact well beyond the 
targeted population. A simple back-of-envelope calculation can help quantify overall spillover 
effects. In particular, the adoption of the shorter workweek implies a reduction of nearly two 
hours in the labor supply of married women, and nearly half an hour in the labor supply of 
                                                 
10 We also estimated first-stage regressions like (1) for the spouses of employed respondents, and the results are 
reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. The own effect of the shorter workweek is -1.8 hours for wives, and -2.1 
hours for husbands, and again we find near zero effects on monthly earnings. 
11 Note that this first-stage effect is virtually identical to that estimated in first-stage regressions reported in Panel 
B of Table 3. However the two samples differ as Panel B of Table 3 includes male employees, and Panel A of 
Table 4 includes husbands of female employees.  
12When estimating cross-hour effects, one may worry about confounding factors such as local labor demand 
shocks. If, say, different regions experience different labor demand trends, and these are correlated to the local 
proportion of treated individuals, then husbands and wives may experience correlated changes in hours of work, 
that would not be driven by intra-household spillovers. To check for this possibility we have estimated a 
specification with region-specific time effects (22 regions x 15 years) and the coefficient of interest were not 
affected in any appreciable way (results not reported).   19
their husbands. Assuming for simplicity that the same probability of treatment (0.4) and the 
same first stage effect ( 2 hours) would apply to all categories of workers, the average direct 
effect of the reform on the male labor supply would be  0.4   2    0.8 hours, whereas the 
average cross effect would be  0.4   0.61   0.5    0.12 hours, where 0.61 represents the 
proportion of male workers who are married to a female wage earner. Thus neglecting 
spillover effects would lead to an underestimate of the overall impact of the workweek 
reduction on male labor supply of about 0.12/ 0.12   0.8    13%. Given that men represent 
about half of the overall employed population, this implies underestimating its impact on the 
overall population by about 0.12/ 0.12   0.8   0.8    7%. 
IV.2   Further estimates: Cross-effects on usual and non-usual working hours  
We have shown that, following a workweek reduction at their workplaces, women work about 
1.9 hours less per week at constant earnings, and their husbands respond by cutting their labor 
supply by about half an hour. The aim of this section is to assess the nature of these labor 
supply spillovers. How did respondents manage to cut their actual hours just after an 
agreement was passed in their spouses’ firm? 
One simple way to shed light on this question is to exploit information provided by the 
LFS on the difference between actual hours (that we denoted by  ) and usual hours (that we 
will denote by   ), defined as the number of hours worked in a typical week.
13 Using this 
information, actual hours   can be conceptualized as the sum of a usual number of hours    
and a non-usual component      , which may be either positive or negative, depending on 
                                                 
13According to the official ILO (2002) definition, usual hours per week represent “the modal value of the number 
of hours actually worked per week over a long period of time”. This definition is applicable to workers with 
regular schedules only (about 85% of cases in the LFS). It does not include irregular or unusual overtime 
(whether worked for a premium pay or not compensated at all) nor unusual absence or rest. As also noted by 
Chemin and Wasmer (2009), French labor laws require labor contracts to be explicit about hours, pay, tasks and 
paid leaves, and as a consequence interviewees would know precisely their normal weekly hours as well as 
contractual changes in these.    20
whether overtime hours exceed various forms of unworked hours (e.g., unusually short 
working days, sickness absence, paid or unpaid leaves, etc...) in a given week.  
Based on this distinction, there are two ways of reducing weekly hours  . The first 
one is to negotiate a new contract with one’s employer, involving a smaller number of usual 
hours   . The second way is to keep one’s contract unchanged, together with the associated 
usual hours   , but to reduce      , and namely some form of work involvement that is 
typically not specified in the contract. It may involve a reduction in overtime work or an 
increase in the take-up rate of leaves or an increase in absenteeism. It would be reasonable to 
expect that the observed cross-effects mostly occur through reductions in      , since such 
reductions do not require the negotiation of a new contract, and are more easily under an 
employee’s individual control than adjustments in usual hours   .  
To look into possible adjustment margins, columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 re-estimate our 
reduced-form specification (3), using   	and       	as dependent variables in turn. The 
sample period is now restricted to 1994-2002, as the information on usual hours is only 
available until 2002 in the LFS. These regressions show a sizeable (-0.59) cross-hour effect 
for non-usual hours      	only, but no cross effect on usual hours   . This finding 
confirms that cross effects on husbands’ hours did not occur through a renegotiation of usual 
working schedules, but mostly through a reduction in non-usual hours. By contrast, the direct 
effect of the shorter workweek mostly happens on usual hours (-1.99), which is consistent 
with the collective nature of these agreements. For women, we did not detect significant 
cross-effects on either usual or non-usual hours (results not reported). 
We next test whether cross-effects in male hours were accompanied by earnings 
losses. Column 3 of Table 5 shows that it is clearly not the case. Using the same reduced-form 
specification as in Table 3, we find that if anything a workweek reduction agreement in the 
wife’s workplace is associated with a 0.8% increase in husband’s earnings, and this effect is   21
marginally significant. Column 4 re-estimates the same specification on the 1994-2002 
sample period, consistently with columns 1 and 2, and the results show lack of earnings 
effects at any conventional significant level.  
As for how adjustments in non-usual hours may be achieved in practice, recent waves 
of the LFS confirm that there exists significant leeway for most employees, and especially for 
the highly-skilled, in reducing their individual involvement in the workplace. From 2003 
onwards the LFS provides information on the take-up rate of paid leaves, as well as on paid 
and unpaid overtime work. During the 2003-2009 period, about 12% of male employees 
declare that their paid holiday entitlement exceeded the amount of paid leave actually taken 
by one week or more. Also, about 23% declare that they have worked overtime in the survey 
week, and that over 61% of their overtime hours were unpaid. For employees in high-skill 
occupations, about 37% have been working overtime, and about 84% of their overtime hours 
were not remunerated (see Table A2). 
Adjustments via these margins are further explored in Table 6, where we report cross-
hour effects on overtime hours and unworked hours, separately. These are defined as    
      m a x       ,0  and           m a x       ,0  , respectively. Table 6 shows 
that cross-hour effects feature strongly on unworked hours (column (2)),
14 while overtime 
hours are hardly affected (column (1)). Further tests show that cross effects on unworked 
hours          involve an increase in the frequency of both unworked weeks (i.e.   0 , 
see column (3)) and unusually short workweeks (i.e.	 0      , see column (4)). 
Interestingly          turns out to be the sole component of labor supply that employees 
may cut unilaterally without earning losses, as discussed in Appendix A. 
Finally, for cases in which      , respondents are asked to state the main reason 
why they worked less than usual in the reference week. Possible answers include: holidays 
                                                 
14 Note that the coefficient on        is now positive, because the fall in labor supply is now picked up by an 
increase in unworked hours.   22
and absence for personal reasons,
15 sickness leave, maternity leave, continuous training, 
unusual workload, strike, and lock-out. Interestingly, we detected significant cross-hour 
effects for the first two categories, namely holidays and sickness leave, which are margins on 
which employees have closer control (results not reported). By contrast, we detected no cross 
effects on any other margin. 
In summary, we find evidence that cross-effects did not entail the renegotiation of 
usual hours with employers or changes in earnings, but involved instead a simple reduction in 
(unpaid) work involvement, whether within a given day, or through an increase in the take-up 
rate of paid vacation and/or sick leave. These margins of adjustment typically have no 
detrimental impact on (current) earnings. 
An explanation for why men may work some unpaid hours in the first place is that 
these may have an impact on future, as opposite to current, earnings, to the extent that 
someone who is more absent from work may lose on prospects of promotion and/or earnings 
growth. Another possible explanation is that some individuals may derive utility from work 
per se. Regardless of the underlying explanation, our results show that men decide to cut on 
such unpaid hours following their wives’ treatment, as increased spousal nonmarket time 
would raise the utility of their own nonmarket time relative to the utility of being at work. 
This mechanism will be illustrated in a simple mode of spousal labor supply in Section IV and 
Appendix B. 
IV.3   Heterogeneous Cross-Hour effects 
As Table A2 shows, workers in high-skill occupations typically work longer hours than the 
less-skilled and are also more likely to do overtime work. High-skill occupations here include 
managers, professionals and engineers at various levels (cadres in the French classification of 
                                                 
15 The exact wording is  «congé annuel,  congé ou absence pour convenance personnelle,  jour férié,  pont, 
récupération».   23
occupations), and cover about 20% of the employed workforce. About 51% of males in these 
occupations work more than 45 hours weekly, while only 24% of those in less-skilled 
occupations do so. For women, the proportions are 21% and 8% respectively. Moreover, high-
skill workers typically have higher control over the organization of their workweek. One 
could therefore expect that high-skill workers are more likely to respond to changes in their 
spouses’ workweek than the less-skilled, who are instead more likely to work the legal 
workweek and therefore would only be able to cut their working hours via new contractual 
agreements.  
To test this assumption, we replicate our previous analysis for men in high-skill 
occupations and other men separately. The results are reported in Table 7, which shows in 
column (1) a strong and significant first-stage effect of the shorter workweek on wives’ 
working hours, which is somewhat higher for wives of managers and professionals than for 
other wives. Interestingly, the associated cross-effect on hours is about three times larger for 
managers and professionals than for other workers (column 2). In particular, managers and 
professionals cut their working time by nearly one hour when their wives are treated, while 
the corresponding figure for workers in other occupations is about 19 minutes. One can draw 
similar conclusions by looking at the probability of working more than 45 hours weekly in 
column (3), which shows that wives’ treatment lowers the likelihood of a long workweek for 
men in managerial or professional jobs by 3.3 percentage points, representing a 6.5% 
reduction on the baseline proportion of 51%. Spillover effects on men’s labor supply thus 
seem a lot stronger for the high-skilled than for the less-skilled.  
We further explore spousal labor supply responses in households with young children, 
as compared to other households. It has been argued that the interdependence of spousal labor 
supply may be stronger when there are young children in the household, as children appear to 
play the role of a “jointly-consumed commodity” for husbands and wives (Lundberg, 1988). 
To test this assumption, Table 8 replicates previous regressions for households with at least   24
one child aged 0-6 and for other households separately. In column 1, we find weaker first-
stage effects for mothers of young children (-1.30) than for other women (-2.08). This 
difference is at least partly explained by higher incidence of part-time work among mothers, 
as for part-timers the mandatory workweek reduction would not necessarily be binding 
(Bloch-London and al., 2003). Moving to reduced-form regressions in column 2, the reaction 
of husbands to their wives’ treatment is noticeably stronger in households with young children 
than in other households, despite a weaker first-stage effect. The presence of at least one 
young child thus clearly increases the reaction of men’s labor supply to their wives working 
hours. Again we did not detect any similar spillovers for wives. 
As the presence of young kids in the household is systematically related to the age of 
respondents, one may worry that the above estimates would be driven by age effects, rather 
than parenthood. To investigate this we further split the sample along the age dimension of 
respondents (18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50+ years old; with or without kids aged 0-6). We find that 
for all age groups the cross-hour effect in the sample with children is higher than the 
corresponding effect estimated on the childless sample (especially in the younger age group), 
thus we do find evidence of genuine parenthood effects. By contrast, in the childless sample, 
we do not find any significant age effects (results not reported).  
V Robustness  checks 
V.1   Alternative Identification 
The previous analysis uses two sources of identification for the cross-hour effects of the 
shorter workweek, and namely the fact some spouses are treated whereas others are not, and 
the fact that not all treated spouses are treated at the same date. In order to check the 
robustness of our estimates, Table 9 replicates the previous regressions using these two   25
sources of identification separately. Specifically, the first-stage regression is based the 
following specification,  
     
          
          
  ∗  1998       2002 	       
  ∗      2002 		 
																											           
  ∗      2002         
            .      ( 4 )  
The parameters of interest are     and    . The     coefficient compares differences in hours 
between those ever treated and the nontreated after 2002 and before 1998. By contrast, the 
    coefficient compares hours worked by those treated later to hours worked by those treated 
earlier.
16  
The corresponding reduced-form equation for the impact of spouse treatment on the 
main respondent’s labor supply is thus  
            
          
  ∗  1998       2002 	        
  ∗      2002  
																																	           
  ∗      2002                                        ,    (5) 
where     and    	are the parameters of interest. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 9 report the estimated first-stage effects on wives’ hours and 
earnings. Reassuringly, the estimates for first-stage effects     and     are both negative, 
highly significant, very similar to each other and very close to the overall effect obtained with 
the basic specification (see Table 3). Column 3 reports reduced-form effects for their 
husbands. The estimates obtained for     and     are again negative, significant, close to each 
other and to the overall reduced-form effect reported in Table 3. 
For females, the estimated cross effects were still negative, but very small in 
magnitude and not significantly different from zero at standard levels, regardless of the source 
of identification (results not reported).  
                                                 
16Note that        
               
  ∗      2002       
  ∗      2002 , so that specifications (3) and (4) are nested. 
In particular, specification (3) is a special case of specification (4), in which we impose           and      
   .   26
V.2 Fixed-effect estimates 
In this section we exploit the panel component of the French LFS to provide fixed-effect 
estimates of the impact of the shorter workweek on spousal labor supply. An important caveat 
here is that the longitudinal dimension available in the LFS is quite short, and spells of 
observation of respondents only rarely overlap with the adoption of the shorter workweek in 
their spouses’ firms. Even when we focus on the 1998-2002 period,
17 only about 10% of 
respondents surveyed are observed both before and after the implementation of the shorter 
workweek in their spouses’ firms (see Table 10). Overall, only about 23,000 male and 29,000 
female respondents can actually contribute to the identification of changes in spouses’ firm 
regulation on respondents’ labor supply.   
With these caveats in mind, we replicate previous regressions controlling for 
individual fixed-effects. Table 11 reports estimates of reduced-form effects on employment, 
hours and earnings for both men and women. Employment and earnings effects of the shorter 
workweek are again nil. The first-stage effect on hours is negative and significant for both 
men (-1.22) and women (-1.21), although this is somewhat smaller than the effect detected in 
cross-section estimates of Table 3. As fixed-effect estimates focus by construction on short-
term effects of worktime agreements, while cross-sectional estimates exploit a longer horizon, 
one may think that the difference between the two may be due to some gradual 
implementation of the shorter workweek. Figures 2 and 5 show that this may be the case for 
husbands, though not for wives. Another possible interpretation is that panel estimates may be 
more seriously affected by measurement error in the actual date of implementation of the 
shorter workweek, which would generate a stronger attenuation bias in fixed-effect estimates.  
                                                 
17Households surveyed either before 1998 or after 2002 did not experience any changes in working time 
regulations while in our panel, and thus cannot contribute to the identification of the effect of these changes on 
spousal labor supply. Our panel estimates thus focus on the 1998-2002 period.    27
The cross-hour effect for husbands is negative (-0.40), although this only becomes 
significant when one looks at the difference between actual and usual hours (-0.76), and again 
it is the amount of unworked hours that is adjusted following wives’ shorter workweeks 
(0.80). For wives, the cross-hour effect is either positive or close to zero, but never 
statistically significant. Overall, our main findings are robust to the introduction of individual 
fixed-effects, although the significance of various effects is reduced in this smaller sample. 
VI. Instrumental  variable  estimates of cross-hour effects 
There is a long standing tradition of labor supply models in which the labor supply decisions 
of married couples are treated as two-person games in which the labor supply of each spouse 
depends not only on own potential wage or unearned income, but also on the number of hours 
spent at work by the other spouse (see Elroy and Horney, 1981, and Lundberg, 1988, 
Chiappori, 1988). These models are hard to estimate since they involve a system of two 
simultaneous equations in which wives’ hours feature in the husbands’ labor supply equation 
and vice versa, and good instruments for independent variation in the labor supply of one of 
the spouses are typically hard to find. This is precisely where the French workweek reform 
could help identify the effects of interest, by generating exogenous variation in the labor 
supply of one spouse. 
While the previous sections have highlighted the reduced-form effect of workweek 
regulations on spousal labor supply, in this section we use workweek regulations in an 
individual’s firm as an instrument for her working hours in her spouse’s labor supply 
equation. As well known, both reduced form parameters and IV estimates are of interest in 
their own right. The former is most policy relevant, as the Government can directly control 
the adoption of the shorter workweek, but of course cannot directly control spousal labor 
supply. Also, reduced form estimates would not require as an exclusion restriction that 
workweek regulations affect spousal labor supply only via their effect on the labor supply of   28
directly treated employees. However, if one is willing to accept this (reasonable) exclusion 
restriction, IV estimates provide the appropriate structural parameter for measuring how labor 
supply responds to independent changes in labor supply of one’s spouse.  
In Appendix B, we develop a very simple labor supply model which embodies the 
main institutional features of the French workweek reform and shows that this structural 
cross-hour parameter can in general be interpreted as the effect of spouse hours on the 
marginal utility of substituting own leisure for own time spent at work. In other words, the 
cross-hour effect can be decomposed into the effect of spouse hours on the utility of own 
leisure, and its effect on the utility of time spent at work. Under the additional assumption that 
spouse hours have, as such, no impact on the utility of own time spent at work at constant 
leisure, the estimated cross-hour parameter provides a direct measure of the degree of 
complementarity of spouses’ leisure in the utility function. 
Below we report estimates of the impact of spousal hours on own hours, having 
instrumented spousal hours by       . The regression results are reported in Table 12 for 
both men (Panel A) and women (Panel B), using the same samples and specifications as in 
Tables 4, 7 and 8. Unsurprisingly, while we detect no significant cross-hour effect for wives 
on either the whole sample or any of the subsamples used, for husbands the cross-hour effect 
is always positive and significant. Among husbands the cross-hour effect in labor supply is 
about twice as large for managers and professionals than for other occupations, and in 
particular when their wives cut their labor supply by one hour, men in high occupations 
respond to by cutting their own labor supply by about 20 minutes. Also, cross hour effects are 
three times larger when there are young children in the household, relative to childless 
families. The quantitative response for fathers is about 35 minutes for each extra hour spent at 
home by their wives, thus suggesting that worktime policy evaluations restricted to direct 
labor supply effects may strongly underestimate its impact on the time spent by fathers with 
their young children.   29
Overall, our estimated cross-hour effects are 0.23 for husbands and negligible for 
wives. These would translate into a social multiplier of labor supply of about 1   0.23/2  
1.1. To the best of our knowledge, our paper provides one of the very first micro-economic 
evaluation of the social multiplier in labor supply at the household level. 
VII.   Conclusions 
This paper has investigated cross-hour effects on the labor supply of men and women using 
independent variation in spousal hours generated by the introduction of the shorter workweek 
in France in the late 1990s. We exploit independent variation in spousal hours of work, at 
constant monthly earnings, which allows us to abstract from income effects of changes in 
spousal labor supply, and focus on pure cross-hour effects.  
We found that both female and male employees treated by the shorter legal workweek 
reduced their weekly labor supply by about 2 hours, and did not experience any reduction in 
their monthly earnings. While wives of treated men did not seem to adjust their working time 
at either the intensive or extensive margins, husbands of treated women responded by cutting 
their workweek by about half an hour to one hour, according to specifications and samples. 
Such gender differences in cross-hour effects are remarkable, especially insofar overall labor 
supply elasticity of women’s is typically higher than men’s (see, among others, Blundell and 
MaCurdy, 1999). 
The labor supply response of men takes place by cutting actual hours below usual 
weekly hours, and is not associated to an earnings’ loss. It seems thus that husbands cut their 
labor supply by adjusting unpaid work margins such as taking more paid vacation or sick 
leaves. These results suggest significant spousal complementarities in leisure time for 
husbands, and namely when a wife’s workweek is reduced, the increase in her leisure time 
raises the value of leisure for her husband and reduces his labor supply.    30
Our results on cross-hour effects are noteworthy as they show that neglecting spousal 
labor supply reactions of spouses may give a misleading view of the overall impact of labor 
supply shocks. In particular, by focusing on the direct impact of policy on the targeted 
population, most existing evaluations of workweek reduction reforms are likely to 
underestimate the effect of these reforms on labor supply in general, and possibly on the time 
spent by parents with their young children. A simple back-of-envelope calculation suggests 
any policy that would neglect spousal labor supply spillover would likely underestimate the 
overall impact on male labor supply by about 13%. And the estimated spillovers would 
translate into a social multiplier around 1.1.   31
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Appendix A: Non-usual hours and earnings 
In our sample usual hours    are defined for about 85% of individuals. For these individuals, 
     	in 73% of cases,      , in 11.6% of cases and      , in the remaining 15.4% of 
cases. Note that  	 and   	 represent weekly-aggregated measures, thus someone who works 
one hour longer than the typical workday for three days in a week and one hour shorter for the 
remaining two days would have      . For simplicity, we will refer to cases in which 
      as cases of overtime work, and to cases in which      	 as cases of unworked 
hours. Conditional on      , 57% of cases correspond to workers who did not work at all 
during the survey week (  0 ), and among them the average number of unworked hours is 
38, and 43% of cases correspond to workers who worked positive hours but still below their 
usual workweek (0      ), and among them the average number of unworked hours is 
10. Conditional on      , the average number of overtime hours is 7.4 hours.  
We have shown in Section IV.2 that cross hour effects mostly happen through 
variations in       rather than variations in   , and specifically through an increase in 
unworked hours         . Here we show that          turns out to be the sole 
component of labor supply that employees may cut without earning losses. To check the latter 
point, Table A3 reports estimates from regressions of monthly earnings on   ,          
and          separately. Column 2 shows that earnings only respond significantly to usual 
hours Hu and excess overtime hours         , whereas unworked hours          have no 
discernible impact, and columns 3-6 show that this result holds true within both the treated 
and the control sample.  
Appendix B: A simple theoretical framework 
Consider a married worker, working   hours and enjoying   hours of leisure, where   and l	 
satisfy the usual (normalized) constraint     1 . We assume that   can be conceptualized   34
as the sum of paid working hours   and unpaid hours  , where only   is chosen by the 
worker, whereas   is defined by a formal contract, depending on the institutional context. As 
a result, earnings   are constant, as the duration of paid work is exogenously set, and the only 
work margin under the worker’s control is unpaid. These assumptions are meant to capture in 
the simplest form the main institutional features of the French workweek regulations. 
We further assume that preferences can be represented by a well-behaved utility 
function    , ,  ,  , where    represents the number of hours worked by the spouse and 
  represents household consumption. The number of unpaid hours   may enter the utility 
function either because investment at work is an intrinsic source of utility for the worker or 
because it is expected to increase the probability of professional success in the future. Spousal 
labor supply     enters the utility function because  the value of own leisure may depend on 
how many hours one’s spouse spends at work or, conversely, in the household. We will not 
need to impose any restriction on the utility function   other than the usual concavity 
assumption. 
Within this framework, the worker chooses    and    in order to maximize 
   , ,  ,    subject to the usual budget constraints 
            1;							          , 
where    denotes spouse’s income. 
This problem is a special case of the more general set-up introduced by Pollak (1969) 
to describe “conditional demand functions”, i.e. consumer’s behavior when the quantity of 
one or more goods is rationed. In our specific case, the optimal  ∗ represents the conditional 
demand for leisure by a worker whose paid hours are institutionally set. Optimal choices  ∗ 
and  ∗	are functions of    and household income      , and optimal labor supply is simply 
 ∗      ∗.   35
Using this notation, the cross-hour effect discussed in this paper corresponds to the 
partial derivative   ∗/         ∗/   . In our empirical context, the worktime regulation 
reform provides a source of variation in   , which is independent of households’ earnings, 
and makes it possible to estimate this cross-hour effect.  
Following Pollak (1969), it is straightforward to recover the relationship between this 
cross-hour effect and the partial derivatives of the utility function,  
  ∗
     
  ∗
     
1
  	
          
     
         
   , 
where    denotes the partial derivative of the utility function with respect to the  th argument, 
    denotes cross-derivatives, and             2           		is positive due to the concavity 
of  .  Hence, one would detect positive cross-hour effects if          , i.e. if spouse working 
time reduces the utility of leisure time more than it raises the utility of unpaid time spent at 
work. Under reasonable conditions, and namely that the utility of time spent at work (at 
constant leisure) is roughly independent of spouse working hours,     ≅0 , a positive cross-
hour effect implies complementarity in spousal leisure time. 
Note finally that in this framework we have implicitly assumed that all nonmarket 
time is leisure, while in reality it can include both leisure and home production. We believe, 
however, that allowing for home production would not substantially alter the interpretation of 
the estimated cross-hour effect. In this case positive cross-hour effects would imply 
complementarity of spousal nonmarket time (maintaining the assumption     ≅0 ), while 
negative cross-hour effects would imply substitutability of nonmarket time, where 
complementarity would be plausibly driven by the leisure component of nonmarket time, 
while substitutability would be driven by the home production component. As we find 
positive cross-hour effects, we should conclude that complementarity of leisure dominates 
substitutability of home production.    36
 
 Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A  Men 
  Full sample   Employed 
  Wife         not 
treated  Wife    treated  
Wife         not 
treated  Wife   treated 
Years of education  12.7 12.4   12.9  12.5
Age  42.6 41.9   41.7  41.0
High-skill occupation (%) 17.7 14.2   19.4  15.4
Private sector (%)  57.1 66.2   64.9  74.6
Spouse’s year of educ.  13.1 12.7   13.2  12.8
Spouse’s age  40.5 39.7   39.7  39.0
Spouse in high-skill occ. (%)  11.1 8.1   11.3  8.3
Spouse in private sector (%)  54.3 90.2   54.4  90.4
No. observations  130,468 59,426   114,705  52,755
Panel B  Women 
  Full sample   Employed 
  Husband  not 
treated 
Husband 
treated   




Years of education  12.6 12.4   13.0  12.8
Age  39.4 39.5   39.5  39.5
High-skill occupation (%) 7.4 5.7   10.4  7.8
Private sector (%)  42.7 47.5   63.0  69.9
Spouse’s year of educ.  12.5 12.2   12.7  12.4
Spouse’s age  41.5 41.6   41.4  41.5
Spouse in high-skill occ. (%)  18.7 16.7   19.3  16.6
Spouse in private sector (%)  72.4 93.6   70.1  92.9
No. observations  150,371 86,431   101,923  58,766
 
Notes. The full sample includes married or cohabiting respondents, whose spouse is an employee. The employed 
subsample is restricted to those classified as employed according to the ILO definition of employment. The 
interpretation of figures is as follows: The average number of years of education for men whose wife is not 
treated is 12.7, and the average number of years of education for their wives is 13.1. High-skill occupations 
include managers, professionals, engineers or associate occupations (cadres). Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, 
Insee. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of own treatment, by spouse treatment (%). 
 
Panel A  Employed men 
  Wife not treated  Wife treated 
Own firm never adopted shorter workweek 71.0 54.2 
Own firm adopted shorter workweek  29.0 45.8 
    - not same year as wife’s firm  29.0 22.8 
    - same year as wife’s firm  - 23.0 
Total   100  100 
Panel B  Employed women 
  Husband not treated  Husband treated 
Own firm never adopted shorter workweek 73.2 58.1 
Own firm adopted shorter workweek  26.8 41.9 
   - not same year as wife’s firm  26.8 21.3 
   - same year as wife’s firm  - 20.6 
Total   100  100 
 
Notes. Panel A : Employed subsample restricted to male respondents.  Panel B: Employed subsample restricted 
to female respondents. The interpretation of figures is as follows: among employed males whose spouse works in 
a treated firm, 45.8% are working in a treated firm.   38
Table 3 
First stage regressions  
Direct effects of the shorter workweek on hours and earnings. 
 
Panel A  Men 
  Wives’ hours    Wives’ earnings 
  (1)  (2)   (3) (4) 






















Additional controls   no  yes   no yes 
No. Observations  189,894  189,894   160,046 160,046 
Panel B  Women 
  Husband’s hours    Husband’s earnings 
  (1)  (2)   (3) (4) 























Additional controls   no  yes   no yes 
No. Observations  236,802  236,802   201,559 201,559 
 
Notes. Columns 1 and 2 refer to the full sample. Columns 3 and 4 refer to the subsample of respondents whose 
spouses have nonmissing earnings (from 2003 onwards, information on earnings is collected on one third of the 
LFS sample). The table shows first stage regressions for hours and earnings of spouses of main respondents. 
Baseline controls include 15 year dummies and a dummy indicating whether the spouse works in public sector. 
Additional controls include spouse’s years of education, age, age squared and 16 industry dummies. Standard 
errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1% and 




Reduced form regressions 
Cross-effects of the shorter workweek on employment and hours. 
 
Panel A  Men
  Own employment 
 
  Own hours 
(conditional on employment) 
  (1)  (2)   (3) (4)  (5)







































Further controls   no  yes   No yes  yes
No. observations  189,894  189,894   167,460 167,460  156,392
Panel B  Women 
  Own employment 
 
  Own hours  
(conditional on employment) 
  (1)  (2)   (3) (4)  (5)











































Further controls   no  yes   No yes  yes
No. observations  236,802  236,802   160,689 160,689  150,371
 
Notes. Columns 1 and 2 refer to the full sample. Columns 3 and 4 refer to the employed subsample. Column 5 
refers to employed respondents who were not treated at the same time as their spouses. The table shows reduced-
form regressions for main respondents, and regresses their employment status and hours on their spouses’ 
treatment variables (   and       ), as well as on their own treatment (  and      ). Baseline controls in 
columns 1 and 2 include include 15 year dummies and a dummy indicating whether the spouse works in the 
public sector. Additional controls in column 2 are spouse’s years of education, age and age square, and 
respondent’s years of education, age and age square. Baseline controls in columns 3-5 include 15 year dummies, 
a public sector dummy, a wage-earner dummy and a dummy indicating whether spouse works in the public 
sector. Additional controls in columns 4 and 5 include spouse’s years of education, age, age square and 16 
industry dummies, and respondent’s years of education, age, age square and 16 industry dummies. Standard 
errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1% and 
5% levels, respectively. Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee.   40
Table 5 
Reduced-form regressions 
Cross-effects of the shorter workweek on types of hours worked and earnings. 
 
   Men 
    Usual 
Hours 
   
  Actual–usual 
hours          
      
 
Earnings 
   
(1)    (2)  
(3) (4) 
     
-0.14
** 
(0.03)   
0.04






































No. Observations    101 139    101 139    124 417  101 139 
 
Notes. Columns 1, 2 and 4 refer to the employed subsample for which usual hours are defined. Columns 3 and 4 
refer to the employed subsample with nonmissing earnings (from 2003 onwards, information on earnings is 
collected on one third of the LFS sample). Regressions include the same set of control variables as in 
specification (4) of Table 4. Standard errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. 
** and 
* 
denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Source: French LFS, 1994 to 2002 (columns 1, 2 and 
4) and 1994 to 2009 (column 3), Insee.  
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Table 6 
Reduced-form regressions 
Cross-effects of the shorter workweek on overtime hours and unworked hours. 
 
  Men 
  Overtime 
hours 
         
Unworked 
hours 






0       
 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 








































No. Observations  101 138  101 138  101 138  101 138 
 
Notes. The Table refers to the employed subsample for which usual hours are defined. Regressions include the 
same set of control variables as in specification (4) of Table 4. Standard errors clustered at the treatment*year 
level are reported in brackets. 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.Source: French 
LFS, 1994 to 2002 (columns 1, 2 and 4) and 1994 to 2009 (column 3), Insee.   42
Table 7 
Direct and cross-effects of the shorter workweek in wives’ firms,  
by men’s occupation. 
 
Panel A   Employed men: Managers, professionals and kindred occ. 
  First stage   Reduced form 
  Wife’s hours   Own hours  Own hours ≥ 45
  (1)   (2) (3) 


























No. observations  30,432   30,432 30,432 
Panel B  Employed men: Other occupations 
  First stage   Reduced form 
  Wife’s hours   Own hours  Own hours ≥ 45
  (1)   (2) (3) 




























No. observations  137,028   137,028 137,028 
 
Notes. Panel A refers to men who are managers, professionals, engineers or associate occupations (cadres). Panel B 
refers to other occupations.. In column 1, control variables are as in column 4 of Table 3. In columns 2 and 3, control 
variables are as in column 4 of Table 4. Standard errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee.   43
Table 8 
Direct and cross-effects of the shorter workweek in wives’ firms,  
by family type. 
 
Panel A   Employed men: Managers, professionals and kindred occ. 
  First stage   Reduced form 
  Wife’s hours   Own hours  Own hours ≥ 45
  (1)   (2) (3) 



























No. observations  39,468  39,468  39,468 
Panel B  Employed men: Other occupations 
  First stage   Reduced form 
  Wife’s hours   Own hours  Own hours ≥ 45
  (1)   (2) (3) 



























No. observations  127,992  127,992  127,992 
 
Notes. Panel A refers to employed men in households with at least on child aged 0-6. Panel B refers to employed 
men in households without children aged 0-6. Control variables are the same as in Table 6. Standard errors 
clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively. Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee. 
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Table 9 
Direct and cross-effects of the shorter workweek in wives’ firms:  
Alternative sources of identification. 
 
  Employed men 
  First stage    Reduced form 
  Wife’s hours  Wife’s 
earnings 
  Own hours 
  (1) (2)   (3) 


























  0.00 
(0.13) 





  -0.26 
(0.17) 
        - -   -1.96
** 
(0.14) 
    - -   -0.09 
(0.12) 
No. observations  167,460  141,623    167,460 
 
Notes.  Columns 1 and 3 refer to the employed subsample, and column 2 refers to the employed 
subsample with nonmissing earnings (from 2003 onwards, information on earnings is collected on one 
third of the LFS sample). In columns 1 and 2, control variables are the same as in columns 2 and 4 of 
Table 3. In column 3, control variables are the same as in column 4 of Table 4. Standard errors clustered 
at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1% and 5% 









Number of observations per respondent and proportion of switchers 
 
Men 
Number of obs. 
per respondent 
Total number  
of respondents 
Total number  
of observations 
Proportion of changes 
in spouses’ firms 
1  26 231  26 231  - 
2  13 916  27 832  11.9% 
3  9 073  27 219  17.9% 
All  49 220  81 282  10.1% 
Women 
Number of obs. 
per respondent 
Total number  
respondents 
Total number  
observations 
Proportion of changes 
in spouses’ firms 
1  31 110  31 110  - 
2  17 292  34 584  14.1% 
3  11 901  35 703  22.6% 
All  60 303  101 397  12.8% 
 
Notes. Sample: Employed subsample, 1998-2002. Interpretation of figures is as follows: 13,916 male 
respondents are observed at two dates and 11.9% have a spouse whose firm passed an agreement between these 
two dates.  Source: French LFS, 1998-2002, Insee.  
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Table 11 
Reduced-form regressions 
Cross-effects of the shorter workweek on employment and hours: Fixed-effect estimates 
 











  Type of hours 





     
Overtime 
hours 
          
Unworked
hours 
         
  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) (5) (6)  (7)


























































No. obs.  81,282  63,796  63,796    56,941  56,941  56,941  56,941 











  Type of hours 
   Usual 
hours
   
Actual-
usual 
      
Overtime 
hours 
          
Unworked
hours 
          
  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) (5) (6)  (7)























































No. obs.  101,397  67,133  67,133    63,236  63,236  63,236  63,236 
 
Notes. Column 1 refers to the full sample, Columns 2 and 3 refer to the employed subsample, and Columns 4 to 7 
refer to the employed subsample for which usual hours are defined. Controls include individuals fixed effects as 
well as the same baseline and additional control variables as in Table 4. Standard errors clustered at the 
treatment*year level are reported in brackets. 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Source: French LFS, 1998-2002, Insee. 
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Table 12 
IV estimates of cross-hour effects 
 
Panel A  Employed men 
  Hours 
  All   High-skilled Other 
Occup. 




  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 















No. observations  167,460  30,432  137,028  39,468  127,992 
Panel B   Employed women 
  Hours 
  All   High-skilled Other 
Occup. 




  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 











No. observations  160,689  15,217  145,472  36,959  123,730 
 
Notes. The Table refers to the employed subsample. Estimates reported show the effect of spousal labor supply 
on the main respondent’s labor supply, using treatment of spousal firms an instrument. The corresponding 
reduced-form results are reported in Tables 4, 7 and 8. Controls include a dummy variable for type of spouse 
firm (  ), 15 year dummies, a wage-earner dummy, a public sector dummy, spouse’s years of education, age, 
age square, 16 spouse’s industry dummies and a dummy indicating whether spouse works in public sector. 
Standard errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. 
** and 
* denote significance at the 
1% and 5% levels, respectively. Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee. 
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Figure 1  













1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total Men Women  49
Figure 2  




Figure 3  
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Figure 4 
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husbands in firms who adopted the shorter workweek
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Figure 6 
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Appendix Tables and Figures 
 
Table A1 
First stage regressions. 
Direct Effects of the Shorter Workweek on Hours Worked and Earnings.  
Subsample of employed respondents. 
 
Panel A  Men 
  Wives’ hours    Wives’ earnings 
  (1)  (2)   (3) (4) 






















Additional controls   no  yes   no Yes 
No. Observations  167 460  167 460   141 623 141 623 
Panel B  Women 
  Husband’s hours    Husband’s earnings 
  (1)  (2)   (3) (4) 























Additional controls   No  Yes   no Yes 
No. Observations  160 689  160 689   135 729 135 729 
 
Notes. Columns 1 and 2: Employed subsample. Columns 3 and 4: Employed subsample restricted to 
respondents on which information on spouses’ earnings is collected (from 2003 onward, information is 
collected on one third of the LFS sample). The table shows the results of regressing spouse’s hours and 
earnings on the treatment status of spouse’s firm (  ) and on whether the shorter workweek is already 
adopted in the spouse’s firm (      ). Baseline and additional control variables are as in Table 3. Standard 
errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1% 
and 5% levels, respectively. Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee. 
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Table A2 
Overtime hours and paid holidays. 
  
Notes. Column 1: employed subsample. Columns 2, 3 and 4: employed subsample restricted to employees with usual hours. High-
skill occupations include managers, professionals, engineers and associate occupations. Source: French LFS, 2003-2009, Insee. 
 
  
  One or more week 










Fraction of overtime 
hours that are paid 
(%) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Men 
  All men  12.4  23.0 7h06m  39.0
  High-skill occupations  14.0  36.6 8h47m  16.4
  Other occupations  11.9  20.4 6h31m  46.7
Women
  All women  15.3  16.5 5h16m  26,5
  High-skill occupations  13.4  31.9 6h53m  13.0
  Other occupations  15.6  14.8 4h53m  29.7  54
Table A3 
Usual hours, actual hours and monthly earnings. 
 
  Men 
  Monthly earnings 
  All   Pre-Reform  Post-reform 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Usual hours  






























Overtime hours       










Unworked hours     







No. Observations  101 138  101 138  89 822  89 822  11 316  11 316 
 
Notes. The sample includes employed men for which usual hours are defined. Columns 3 and 4 include 
observations in firms that have not (yet) adopted the shorter workweek. Columns 5 and 6 include observations in 
that have already adopted the shorter workweek. All regressions include controls as column (4) in Table 4. 
Standard errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. 
** and 
* denote significance at the 
1% and 5% levels respectively. Source: French LFS, 1994 to 2002, Insee.  
 
 




Men's hours worked, by wife’s firm status 
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Figure A2 
Men's hours worked, by firm status of the wife  
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